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The Treaty Establishing a Constitution 
for Europe: Stalled Ratification and 
the Difficulty of the European Union 
in Connecting to its Citizens 
Eileen Kirley-Tallon 
Francis Marion University 
The process of ratification of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe is now stalled following the de-
feat of the Treat y in referenda in France and the Nether-
lands in 2005. The probable demise of the Treaty has 
provoked discussion of a "c risis" in the European Union. 
The crisis the Union faces stems not so much from the 
failure of the Treaty but what failure indicates : a discon-
nect between the European Union and its citizens. Citi-
zens have had little impact on decision-making in the 
Union in the past even though they elect representatives 
to the European Parliament. The gap between the Union 
and its citizens is widening as the legitimacy of the Un-
ion comes into question and citizens indicate less support 
for the Union and its policies and operations. 
The foundational law of the Europea n Union is found in the multitude of treaties signed by the governments of the member countries. These treaties, though not constitu-
tions, incorporate much of what is found in national constitu-
tions. The treaties establish the powers (called competencies) of 
the Union, create institutions to make, enforce, and adjudicate 
Union laws, and establish decision-making procedures. There are 
four treaties of the European Union which are considered found-
ing treaties: the Treaty of Paris (1951), the (two) Treaties of 
Rome (1958), and the Treaty on European Union (1993) usually 
referred to as the Maastricht Treaty. In addition to the founding 
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treaties , there are multiple other treaties which play a role in 
governance of the Union , including the Treaties of Amsterdam 
(1999) and Nice (2003) . 
The process of writing and revising these treaties historically 
has not involved participation by the citizens of most member 
states . Rather , treaties are negotiated by high level executive of-
ficials from all member states and then, in almost all cases , sub-
mitted to the parliaments of member states for ratification . In a 
limited number of cases , member states have submitted treaties 
to citizens in consultative referenda which also require approval 
by the national parliament. In most cases these referenda have 
resulted in a vote of approval from the member state 's citizens. 
Examples of such successful referenda include Denmark 's ap-
proval of the Single European Act ( 1986), the Maastricht Treaty 
( 1993) and the Treaty of Amsterdam ( 1998). Also successful was 
the referendum held in France on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 
and the referenda in Ireland on the Single European Act (1987), 
Maastricht (1992) , Amsterdam (1998) , and Nice (2002) (Euro-
pean Union 2006) . 
This list of successes may appear impressive and suggests 
that European citizens (at least in the referenda member states) 
support the Union , its decisions, policies, and objectives . But in 
the case of two of the successful referenda listed above , the vot-
ers had originally rejected a treaty in a referendum. In 1992, 
Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty and in 2001 Irish 
voters rejected the Treaty of Nice . 
The voters in Denmark rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 
June 1992 with 50.7% voting "no ." This vote put the Treaty in 
jeopardy , but the assumption was that the Danes would recon-
sider and would, eventually , approve the Treaty. At the Decem-
ber 1992 European Council meeting (under the British 
Presidency) , assurances were made to help the Danish govern-
ment sell the Treaty to its citizens at a second referendum . Three 
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promises were made. First, the leaders pledged to increase the 
transparency (openness) of decision-making in the Union, and 
especially in the Council of Ministers. Second , the Danes were 
assured that the Union would not make decisions in areas of pol-
icy that were better left to national governments. And, finally, 
Denmark was promised that, once the Maastricht Treaty was rati-
fied, the Union would begin the negotiations to admit Denmark 's 
neighbors Sweden , Finland , and Norway to the Union . Denmark 
held its second referendum in May 1993, and the vote in favor of 
the Treaty was 56.8% (Wood and Yesilada 2004 , 73). 
Denmark's initial rejection of the Maastricht Treaty pointed 
to a larger looming problem within the Union . Citizens (at least 
those in Denmark) had objections to the decisions leaders had 
made regarding both deeper economic integration and additional 
areas of policy making by the institutions of the European Un-
ion. These decisions about integration and policies by Union in-
stitutions had typically been made by the governmental leaders , 
the elites, of the member states. In the past citizens had gone 
along with, or perhaps simply paid no attention to, actions by 
leaders to write and revise treaties. This was the case even 
though these treaties would affect European citizens by increas-
ing integration within the Union and increasing the powers and 
decision-making responsibilities of the Union institutions . Dan-
ish voters were not quite certain this was acceptable and said so 
in their votes in the first referendum on Maastricht. The idea that 
citizens would accept decisions made by European leaders with-
out the involvement of citizens in the process has been referred 
to as a "permissive consensus," which some have argued allowed 
European leaders to make decisions in the name of their citizens 
because citizens of the member states permitted this. But the era 
of "permissive consensus " arguably ended with the Danish rejec-
tion of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (Kurpas et al. 2005). 
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Danish citizens had tended to be more Eurosceptic than citi-
zens in many other member states in the European Union by 
questioning the ever-closer integration within the Union and its 
greater decision-making powers . Therefore, it was not surprising 
that citizen disapproval for the Union should first emerge in 
Denmark. But the rejection of the Treaty of Nice by Irish voters 
in 200 I indicated the lack of citizen support for the Union was 
more widespread . Irish citizens historically had been some of the 
most supportive of the Union and have been referred to by one 
author as Europhiles (Smith 2005). So, the rejection of the Treaty 
of Nice in a referendum in 200 I was surprising. The referendum 
in June 2001 in Ireland produced a low voter turnout. Only 35% 
of Irish voters participated, a marked contrast to the 62% turnout 
in the Irish referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1998. 
Fifty-four percent of those participating voted "no" on the Treaty 
of Nice despite the fact that Ireland benefited substantially from 
membership. As one of the poorer nations in the Union, Ireland 
has received a great deal of monetary aid from it. This has led to 
economic development and prosperity in Ireland and Irish citi-
zens are aware of how much Union membership advantages Ire-
land, making the "no" vote in 2001 all the more surprising. 
Fortunately for the Union and the Treaty of Nice, a second refer-
endum in October 2002 produced a "yes" vote of 63% (Wood 
and Yesilada 2004, 85-86). Nonetheless, the initial "no" vote 
raised questions among the leaders. Perhaps Europe's citizens 
were not as convinced of the wisdom or advisability of the 
changes their leaders were proposing. Perhaps citizens would no 
longer agree to permit the future of the Union to be decided by 
leaders without input from citizens. 
This led to a decision, made by the European Council at its 
meeting in Laeken in December 2001, to convene a Conve ntion 
on the Future of Europe (European Council 2001). It was hoped 
that this Convention would stimulate a debate on the European 
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Union and its future that would involve many groups of people 
and not simply leaders of the Union and officials in the institu-
tions of the Union (such as the Commission and the European 
Parliament). In its Laeken Declaration the European Council 
provided for the composition of the Convention, and it was to be 
broadly based including representatives of national governments 
and parliaments, as well as representatives of the European Par-
liament and the European Commission. It was hoped that as the 
Convention did its work and considered proposals for treaty re-
visions, the citizens of member countries would become engaged 
and debate the issues being discussed at the Convention. Though 
the Convention operated in a very open fashion and made all of 
its documents available to the public via the Internet, the average 
citizen in member countries was barely aware of the existence of 
the Convention, much less its workings and the document it was 
to produce-the draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe. 
This opportunity for the Union to connect with its citizens 
fell flat, though some groups of citizens in member states did pay 
attention to the Convention and its draft Treaty. Several organi-
zations were active in a grass roots movement demanding that 
the Constitutional Treaty be submitted to the voters in referenda 
in the member states of the European Union. One such organiza-
tion was the European Referendum Campaign, which had some 
success in getting backing for its proposal regarding the use of 
referenda in the ratification process both from some members of 
the Convention on the Future of Europe and from the leaders of 
some member states (European Referendum Campaign 2003). 
Also involved in the grass roots campaign was the Initiative and 
Referendum Institute-Europe, which not only advocated refer-
enda in member states to ratify the Constitutional Treaty, but also 
proposed a European citizens' lawmaking process which would 
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directly involve citizens in making Union law (The Initiative and 
Referendum Institute Europe 2003). 
Whether because of pressure from such groups or the more 
general recognition that the "permissive consensus" had evapo-
rated and citizens needed to be more involved in deciding mat-
ters in the European Union, decisions were made by leaders of 
many member states to submit the Constitutional Treaty to citi-
zens in referenda. A consensus among leaders seemed to be that 
the Union could not continue to move forward and make pro-
gress unless citizens were somehow included in decisions about 
the Union. In addition, leaders began to believe that citizens had 
to be sold on these decisions so that they had a sense of owner-
ship. Unless the Union began to connect with its citizens, they 
would increasingly become less and less supportive. In the past, 
only a few member states had ever held referenda on treaties. 
But, after the signing of the Constitutional Treaty in October 
2004, at least ten member states announced intentions to hold 
referenda, hoping to engage their citizens in the debate on the 
Constitutional Treaty and the European Union itself. 
Some of the member states who announced referenda did so 
because it was required by their respective national constitut ions. 
This is true in both Denmark and Ireland, whose constitutions 
require that any treaty which results in a transfer of sovereignty 
by the nation to an international organization must be approved 
by the citizens (Kurpas, Incerti and Schoenlau 2005) . In France 
the President of the Republic has the power to call a referendum 
and President Chirac decided that the Constitutional Treaty 
would be submitted to the voters for approval. In the past, presi-
dents in France had used referenda to shore up falling support for 
their governments by treating citizen approval of referenda as 
approval of the president and his policies. National political con-
siderations were dominant in the decision by the French presi-
dent to submit the Constitutional Treaty to the people for 
approval. The French Parliament also had to be involved. The 
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Constitutional Council in France had ruled that ratification of the 
EU Constitutional Treaty would make change in the French Con-
stitution necessary (Kurpas, Incerti and Schoenlau 2005). Par-
liament must approve amendments to the French Constitution, 
and did so prior to the popular vote in the referendum. 
In some other member states the decision to hold a referen-
dum may have been made for political reasons as well. In the 
United Kingdom the announcement that a referendum would be 
held in 2006 took the issue of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
European Union off the table in the parliamentary election de-
bate in 2005, allowing all candidates and parties to simply ignore 
European issues. Some member states may have decided to hold 
a referendum for cynical reasons, that is, the hope that the Con-
stitutional Treaty would be voted down, but that seems unlikely. 
All but one of the national leaders of the twenty-five member 
states favored the Treaty and all heads of government expressed 
support for the Constitutional Treaty. Vaclav Klaus, the President 
of the Czech Republic, was seen as likely to oppose the Constitu-
tional Treaty, but, as head of state and not of government, his 
position was not that of the Czech government. In any case it 
seemed likely that President Klaus would maintain a "low pro-
file" (Kurpas, lncerti and Schoenlau 2005) in the debate in the 
Czech Republic. 
THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UN JON 
With the exception of a few referenda on treaties and other 
European issues, the role of the people in the European Union 
has been limited to the election of members of the European Par-
liament. Most of the referenda held in member countries have 
been on the ratification of various treaties, but some member 
states have held referenda on other European issues. Notably, 
Sweden held a referendum on the question of whether to adopt 
the euro as its currency and, thus, become part of the eurozone 
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within the European Union. Member states were allowed not to 
adopt the euro when it was introduced as the Union's common 
currency. This was provided in the Treaty on European Unio n 
which established a three stage process to move toward the sin-
gle currency. Leaders were concerned that the Treaty might not 
be ratified if member states had no choice about adopting the 
euro . Three member states, Denmark , Sweden, and the United 
Kingdon, decided not to adopt the euro and, thus, retained their 
national currencies when the euro went into effect January I , 
2002 (Wood and Yesilada 2004, 83 ). 
The Swedish government originally rejected the euro, but 
later, in 2003, held a referendum on participation in the single 
currency. In the campaign preceding the September 14 vote, op-
ponents argued that adoption of the single currency would cause 
an increase in prices and that giving up the national currency 
would result in a loss of Swedish sovereignty (Bruter 2004, 143 ). 
The "no" campaign proved to be more effective than the 
"yes" campaign in shaping public opinion. Opinion polls leading 
up to the vote showed that the "no" vote was leading, despite the 
support of the main political parties in Sweden . A few days be-
fore the referendum vote , the Finance Minister, Anna Lindh, was 
assassinated. Ms. Lindh was the most prominent woman in the 
government and an effective campaigner for the "yes" vote. The 
media in Sweden and elsewhere speculated that her assassination 
might increase both turnout and the "yes" vote as a sympathy 
vote. It did not happen. The "no" vote won with 55.9%. The 
"yes" vote was only 42% (Bruter 2004, 144). The "no" voters 
were concentrated in rural areas and among older suburban 
working class voters. In the city of Stockholm, 56.1 % voted 
"yes" and only 41.7% voted ''no." A majority of urban working 
class voters and young people supported joining the single cur-
rency (Bruter 2004, 145). Due to fear of having its referendum 
influenced by the Swedish outcome, the government in Denmark 
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decided to postpone its referendum, even though public opinion 
polls showed a slight lead for the "yes" vote in Denmark. 
Though Swedish citizens got to decide not to adopt the euro, 
the main participation avenue for citizens in the European Union 
is the election of representatives from their country to the Euro-
pean Parliament. Originally, the members of the European Par-
liament (MEPs) were not elected but appointed by their 
respective member state's legislature. However, direct elections 
to the European Parliament have been held since 1979. These 
elections are held every five years as the term of MEPs is five 
years. The importance of electing MEPs was, however, not sub-
stantial in the early years of direct elections. The people could 
directly choose their representatives, but these elected represen-
tatives had little power and played little role in the decision-
making of the European Union. 
For the most part, the institutions of importance and power 
in making Union laws were the European Commission, which 
proposed new rules and then implemented those adopted, and the 
Council of Ministers, which was the policy-making body of the 
Union and adopted Union laws. The European Parliament had to 
be consulted by the Council of Ministers through the consulta-
tion procedure established in the Treaties of Rome, but the opin-
ion of the Parliament could be ignored by the Council. The 
Single European Act of 1987 added two new procedures for de-
cision-making in the Union, but neither these nor the consulta-
tion procedure made the parliament a major player in policy 
adoption. However, that changed with the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993. Maastricht 
introduced a new procedure, co-decision, which makes the Euro-
pean Parliament the equal of the Council of Ministers on matters 
that are subject to the co-decision procedure (Kirley-Tallon 
2004). Under co-decision, a proposal of the Commission must be 
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approved by both the Council and the Parliament. Therefore, the 
European Parliament can now prevent the adoption of policies to 
which it is opposed. The co-decision procedure was simplified 
somewhat by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and additional 
areas of policy were stipulated as covered by co-decision in both 
the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice (2003) . The Constitutional 
Treaty , were it to be ratified, would extend co-decision even fur-
ther and would name co-decision as the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure. 
Though the European Parliament has evolved into a more 
important and powerful institution, citizens show little concern 
for, nor interest in, the Parliament. Turnout is low on average 
( compared to turnout for national elections in the member states, 
especially those for national legislatures) and has declined con-
sistently since the first election in 1979. Average turnout rates in 
the Union have declined from 63% in 1979 to 45.6% in 2004. 
Average turnout rates for all European Parliamentary elections, 
as well as turnout rates for individual member states , are pre-
sented in Table 1. Empty cells in the table indicate that a member 
state had not yet acceded to the Union and, therefore, its citizens 
did not elect MEPs (European Union 2004) . 
Averages mask differences between the member states of the 
Union in turnout. Some member states have turnout rates sub-
stantially higher or lower than other member states. For example, 
in the most recent elections to the European Parliament in 2004 
the turnout was 90.81% in Belgium but only 38.90% in the 
United Kingdom. The lowest turnout rates in the 2004 elections 
were found in some of the newest members of the Union : the ten 
Central and Eastern European nations which acceded to the Un-
ion May 1, 2004, and whose citizens voted in their first Euro-
pean Parliament election in June of 2004 . Among those ten 
member states only Cyprus and Malta did not have low turnout 
rates in the 2004 elections. 
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This is in marked contrast to the turnout rates in accession 
referenda held in these newest member states of the Union. Nine 
of these ten member states allowed their citizens to play a role in 
deciding if the country would join the Union . Cyprus held no 
referendum but ratified the accession treaty by a unanimous vote 
in its parliament. In the nine referenda on whether or not to join 
Table 1 
Turnout in European Parliamentary Elections 
Member States 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 
Austria 49.40 42.43 
Belgium 91.40 92.20 90.70 90.70 91.00 90.81 
Cyprus 71.19 
Czech Rep. 28.30 
Denmark 47.80 52.40 46.20 52.90 50.50 47.90 
Estonia 26.89 
Finland 31.40 41.10 
France 60.70 56.70 48 .70 52.70 46.80 42.75 
Germany 65.70 56.80 62.30 60.00 45 .20 43.00 
Greece 77.20 79.90 71.20 75.30 63.40 
Hungary 38.50 
Ireland 63.60 47.60 68.30 44.00 50.20 59.70 
Italy 84.90 83.40 81.50 74.80 70.80 73.10 
Latvia 41.34 
Lithuania 48 .38 
Luxembourg 88.90 88.80 87.40 88.50 87.30 90.00 
Malta 82.37 
Netherlands 57.80 50.60 47.20 35.60 30.00 39.30 
Poland 20.87 
Portugal 51.20 35.50 40 .00 38.79 
Slovakia 16.96 
Slovenia 28.30 
Spain 54.60 59. 10 63.00 45 . 10 
Sweden 38.80 37.80 
U.K. 32.20 32.60 36.20 36.40 24.00 38.90 
EU Average 63.00 61.00 58.50 56.80 49.80 45.60 
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the Union, turnout rates were high . In all but one country turnout 
was over 50%, and in many cases turnout was well over 50%. 
The results of the accession referenda as well as the turnout 
rates are presented in Table 2 (European Commission 2003). All 
accession referenda in these nine countries were held in 2003. 
Table 2 
Results and Turnout in Accession Referenda 
Country 
Czech Republic 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malta 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Percent "Yes" 
77.33 
68.83 
83.76 
67.00 
89.95 
53.60 
77.45 
92.46 
89.64 
Turnout 
55.21 
64.06 
45 .62 
72.00 
63.37 
91.00 
58.85 
52.15 
60.44 
Citizens in the newest member states participated in large 
numbers in the referenda on accession to the Union and they 
voted overwhelmingly in favor of joining the Union. Clearly, 
joining the European Union was very important to these citizens. 
But the next year, one month after accession, they chose in most 
member states to stay home in overwhelming numbers rather 
than participate in choosing their countries' first MEPs . The no-
table exception is Cyprus. Slightly more than 71 % of Cypriots 
did participate in choosing MEPs to represent them in the Euro-
pean Parliament. The citizens in nine of the newest member 
states appear to have ascribed little importance to these elections. 
Joining the Union was important; choosing MEPs was not. 
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In the other fifteen member states, turnout in 2004 was in 
most cases low and, in most cases , lower than it had been in pre-
vious European Parliamentary elections. The data in Table I in-
dicate some exceptions to these statements, but in general 
European citizens appear to place less and less importance on 
participation in choosing MEPs even as the Parliament has 
gained more and more decision making power within the Union. 
Why do European citizens not vote in larger numbers in 
elections to the European Parliament? This is an important ques-
tion because the Parliament is the institution of the European 
Union which allows citizens to have the strongest influence on 
policy making. The democratic legitimacy of the Union is tied to 
this institution since only its members are directly chosen by citi-
zens and accountable to them. Part of the answer lies in the fact 
that citizens do not see these elections as important; certainly 
they do not view them as important as national elections for rep-
resentatives to their r"!spective legislatures. 
But even if citizens viewed these elections as important and 
did participate in larger numbers, their choices of MEPs would 
not result in greater citizen input into and influence over Union 
policy decisions controlled somewhat by the European Parlia-
ment. This is because European Parliamentary election cam-
paigns do not focus on European issues . Instead , these 
campaigns focus on national issues. Since the major parties in 
most member states support the Union, the parties do not nomi-
nate candidates for the Parliament who might put on the table 
questions of the usefulness and rightness of the Union and its 
policies. Candidates for the European Parliament from major 
parties tend to agree that the Union is a good thing and that it is 
going in the right direction. European voters are not presented by 
the candidates with clear choices regarding the future of the Un-
ion and its policies. This may well be an important part of why 
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European voters do not see these elections as important. Voters 
are not being offered choices relevant to the policies and direc-
tion of the Union and they may well believe that participation 
will have no impact on what the Union does. They may justifia-
bly believe that their votes make no difference. Those voters who 
do choose to participate vote on the basis of national issues and 
domestic politics, which do vary across political parties and can-
didates. 
This means that instead of a European election campaign for 
the European Parliament there tend to be twenty-five national 
election campaigns, one in each member state (Smith 2005). 
Therefore, the outcome of elections of MEPs does not ensure 
that the will of the people is represented in European Parliamen-
tary decision-making with respect to decisions about the direc-
tion and policy of the Union. Elections to the European 
Parliament do not "present citizens with a choice between com-
peting groups of European parties that propose different options 
for the future policies of the Union." (Working Group 2006, 6). 
The preferences of the people expressed in elections to the Euro-
pean Parliament reflect the people's will on national matters, not 
European matters. 
That election campaigns for the European Parliament are 
actually separate campaigns, one in each member state, would 
seem to be related to the relative lack of attachment citizens in 
the member countries feel to the European Union. The European 
Commission authorizes public opinion polls, called Standard 
Eurobarometers, twice a year. In the May-June 2005 poll (Num-
ber 63), respondents were asked how attached they felt to their 
town, their region, their country, and Europe (European Com-
mission 2005a). Citizens felt most attached to their country 
(91 %), followed by the region or city in which they live (87%). 
Attachment to Europe was mentioned by 66%, a large majority, 
but clearly many fewer people than indicated attachment to their 
Tl IE JOURNAL OF POLITIC 1\L SCIENCE 
THE TREATY ESTABLISHING 109 
A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 
country and region/city. There is variation from member state to 
member state within the Union . Higher percentages of people 
expressing attachment to Europe can be found in, for example, 
Belgium (72%) , the Czech Republic (74%) , Italy (75%) , Lux-
embourg (82%) , and Hungary (92%). In all of these cases, how-
ever. the percentage of people who said they were attached to 
their country was higher than the percentage who said they were 
attached to Europe. In some member states, attachment to 
Europe was felt by few. Cyprus at 32% stands out, but there are 
quite a few other member states in which the percentage who 
expressed attachment to Europe was only in the 40s. 
One author has characterized the right to participate in elec-
tions for institutions which make decisions that impact people's 
lives and are binding on them as providing "input legitimacy" 
and argues that there is now "ample scope" for this form of le-
gitimacy in the European Union because of direct elections to the 
European Parliament (Smith 2005). In the past citizens' views 
were not represented directly in the policy-making institutions of 
the European Union, but the Union had, nonetheless, "output 
legitimacy." Output legitimacy means that integration and the 
activities of the Union gained support and acceptance from the 
people because of the activities of the Union and the benefits that 
those activities secured for citizens of the member states. Now 
the Union can be seen as possessing "input legitimacy," but 
seems to be losing "output legitimacy" as more citizens appear 
not to support the decisions on further integration and policy 
which leaders have taken. But that disaffection does not receive 
expression in the election of MEPs. 
STALLED RATIFICATION FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 
Once the heads of state or government of the member states 
of the Union had signed the Constitutional Treaty at the Euro-
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pean Council on October 29, 2004 , the Treaty was submitted to 
the twenty-five member states for ratification. As with all previ-
ous treaties , the Constitutional Treaty would be ratified only if 
all twenty-five member states appro ved it through their individu-
ally selected ratification procedures . Though most member states 
chose to use the parliamentary method for ratification, a record 
number of ten member states announced intentions to submit the 
Treaty to their citizens in a referendum . Though most of these 
referenda were to be consultative , governments announced ahead 
of time that they would respect the vote of their citizens. 
All of the early ratifications were in member states which 
had selected parliamentary ratification as the method to be used. 
The first to approve the Constitutional Treaty was new member 
state Lithuania, followed quickly by Hungary and Slovenia. 
These three ratifications took place before the first member state 
(Spain) held a referendum. Eventually Lithuania , Hungary , Slo-
venia , Italy, Greece, Slovakia , Austria , Germany , Latvia, Cyprus, 
Malta, Belgium, Estonia , and Finland ratified the Constitutional 
Treaty by means of a vote in their respective legislatures. The 
first legislative ratification in Lithuania occurred in November 
2004; that in Finland occurred in December 2006 . These ratifica-
tion successes involved no direct input from the citizens in these 
countries. But, of course , the argument can be made for the de-
mocratic legitimacy of these ratifications based on two factors: 
national executive leaders, either directly elected or indirectly 
elected by the people, were involved in negotiating the Constitu-
tional Treaty; and national legislatures , directly elected by the 
people , voted to approve the Constitutional Treaty . 
Ten member states either intended to hold a referendum or 
leaned in that direction. Whatever the reasons for choosing to 
hold a referendum , these member states were going to give citi-
zens major input into the decision to ratify the Treaty, and there-
fore a major say about the foundational law of the European 
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the national legislatures in these two member states approved the 
Treaty in accord with their promises to respect the vote of the 
people. The referenda were held in Spain on February 20, 2005 , 
in France on May 29, 2005 , in the Netherlands on June 1, 2005 , 
and in Luxembourg on July 10, 2005 . Results of the referenda 
are presented in Table 3 (European Commission 2005b, 2005c , 
2005d, 2005e) . Other referenda which had been scheduled or 
planned were postponed or cancelled after the June 16-17, 2005, 
European Council meeting . 
Table 3 
Results and Turnout in Referenda on the 
Constitutional Treaty During 2005 
Member States Percent Percent Turnout 
"Yes" "No'· 
Spain 76.70 17.20 42 .30 
France 45.33 54.70 69 .34 
Netherlands 38.40 61.60 62.80 
Luxembourg 56.52 43.48 96.00 
The two successful referenda yielded turnouts of 42.30% in 
Spain (Wagner 2005), and 96.00% in Luxembourg, which has 
compulsory voting (European Commission 2005e) . The turnout 
in Spain was somewhat disappointing and, in fact, was lower 
than had been the turnout in the 2004 European Parliament elec-
tion in Spain in which turnout reached 45 . I 0%. Did voters stay 
home because of opposition to the Constitutional Treaty , making 
the impressive "yes" vote less significant? 
A post-referendum survey in Spain (European Commission 
2005d) indicated opposition to the Constitutional Treaty did not 
keep voters away . The major reason given by non-voting respon-
dents was the lack of · information about the Constitutional 
TIIE JOURNAL OF POLITI C1\J. SCIENCE 
THE TREATY ESTABL!SHJNG 111 
A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE 
nion. Clearly the .decision to hold a referendum was a gamble 
on the part of leaders . The elites may have supported the Treaty, 
but whether the people would was another matter entirely, espe-
cially after the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish 
voters in 1992. It was no longer clear that European voters would 
support their leaders ' decisions about Europe and its direction. 
The "permissive consensus" was breaking down . 
Why take the gamble? One possible reason was to enhance 
the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. Ever since the 
adoption of the Single European Act in 1987, European leaders 
have concerned themselves with the democratic deficit in the 
Union. The member 's concern with the lack of democracy 
moved them to include a greater role for the European Parlia-
ment in new treaties and to give Parliament greater powers as the 
only directly elected institution of the Union . Allowing citizens 
to decide the fate of the Constitutional Treaty would allow lead-
ers in those member states to argue that democracy is served by 
putting the decision in the hands of voters and allowing the will 
of the people to prevail. The referenda could also encourage citi-
zen engagement with the European Union , something the elec-
tions to the European Parliament had thus far failed to 
accomplish. 
Referenda were likely in, or scheduled by, these ten member 
states: the Czech Republic , Denmark, Spain , France, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal , and the United 
Kingdom (Kurpas, Incerti , Schoenlau, and DeClerck-Sachsse 
2005). Only three referenda (in Spain, France and the Nether-
lands) had been held when the ratification process was stalled by 
the "no" votes in the referenda in France and the Netherlands. 
One member state (Luxembourg) chose to go ahead with a refer-
endum despite the "no" votes in France and the Netherlands. In 
Spain and Luxembourg the "yes" vote prevailed . Subsequently 
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Treaty . Another reason was the lack of a public debate on the 
Treaty, apparently due to the short time from the signing of the 
Treaty on October 29, 2004 and the referendum on February 20, 
2005. However some blame may lie on the shoulders of Spanish 
governmental leaders who may not have effectively communi-
cated the importance of the Treaty to the voters. The approving 
voters , the overwhelming majority, did so because of their over-
all support of the European Union and not because of their opin-
ion of the Constitutional Treaty. The "no" vote in Spain , albeit 
small, was influenced by negative views of the Treaty. 
In Luxembourg turnout was high, as it always is, because of 
compulsory voting . The government in Luxembourg decided to 
go ahead with the referendum on July I 0, even though voters in 
both France and the Netherlands had already rejected the Treaty . 
The Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, bad 
served as the President of the European Council for the first half 
of 2005 and was determined to get approval of the Treaty from 
his citizens . He even went so far as to say that he would resign if 
the voters did not approve the Treaty . So the referendum, the first 
in Luxembourg since 1936 (Poirier 2005), went ahead as sched-
uled even as other member states were postponing their sched-
uled or planned referenda. The "yes" vote prevailed and Prime 
Minister Juncker was vindicated. 
The "no " votes in the referenda in France and the Nether-
lands dealt a significant blow to the Constitutional Treaty. 
Whether the blow is the death of the Treaty remains to be seen , 
but for certain the blow from these defeats has stalled the ratifi-
cation process and may have ended it. In these two nations most 
voters did choose to participate, with turnout at 69 .34% in 
France (Europ_ean Commission 2005b) and 62.80% in the Neth-
erlands (European Commission 2005c) . In both countries sub-
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stantial majorities rejected the Treaty. The results were clear, but 
why did voters say "no" to the Treaty? 
Post-referenda surveys were completed by the European 
Commission in both nations. In France the "no" vote was moti-
vated by a multiplicity of reasons . Thirty-one percent of "no" 
voters did so because they believed the Constitutional Treaty 
would have negative effects on employment in France. Another 
reason cited by 26% was the belief that the French economy was 
too weak with too much unemployment. Opposition to French 
political leaders was cited as a reason by 18% of the "no" voters. 
The survey authors concluded that the reasons for the "no" vote 
in France were based on national and/or social concerns which 
were more important in the eyes of "no" voters than European 
considerations. Opposition voters simply believed that the Treaty 
would not be in the best interests of France, especially with re-
spect to economic matters. They also rejected the judgment of 
their national leaders that the Treaty would be good for France. 
France is both a founding member of the European Union and 
one of the largest member states, making its rejection of the 
Treaty significant. Future research on the role of interest groups 
in the campaigns for and against the Treaty, especially in those 
member states, such as France, in which the Treaty was rejected, 
would be useful and interesting. 
The rejection of the Treaty by a second founding member of 
the European Union, the Netherlands, may have dealt a death 
blow to the Constitutional Treaty. When the voters in the Nether-
lands voted June 1, 2005, they were voting in the first referen-
dum ever held on any matter in their country . Why did they 
reject the Treaty by an even larger "no" vote than had obtained in 
France? The European Commission's post-referendum survey in 
the Netherlands showed that quite a few Dutch "no" voters 
lacked information (31 %). But many cited other reasons, some 
indicating disaffection with the European Union and with the 
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onstitutional Treaty. Nineteen percent of "no" voters opposed 
the Treaty itself, citing their fear the Netherlands would lose na-
tional sovereignty were the Treaty approved . Thirteen percent 
said that Europe (the Union) is too expensive , based on the fact 
that the Netherlands is a net contributor to the Union and re-
ceives less in benefits from the Union than it contributes. This 
reason captures a segment of opinion directly opposed to the 
European Union. Eight percent of Dutch "no" voters said they 
voted "no" because of opposition to Europe , the Union, and inte-
gration . These results clearly indicate great disaffection with the 
Union and the Treaty among Dutch citizens, who, like the 
French , did not accept the endorsement by their national leaders 
of the Constitutional Treaty . 
Kees Aarts and Henk van der Kolk (2006 , 243) argue, based 
on data from the 2005 Dutch Referendum study, that the referen-
dum results in the Netherlands showed fully, for the first time, a 
gap between elites and voters in the Netherlands on views con-
cerning the direction and pace of change in the European Union . 
They also argue that elite a:id popular views about the Union 
diverge considerably in two areas . The first area is the pace and 
scope of integration within the Union. Elites in the Netherlands 
support ever expanding integration within the Union . Dutch vot-
ers , on the other hand , are especially skeptical regarding the 
common currency and see the euro as having disadvantages and 
costs. The second area of divergence is the area of the continuing 
enlargement of the Union. Elites support continued enlargement, 
but Aarts and van der Kolk argue that Dutch voters see the ac-
cession of nations in the east and particularly Turkey as possible 
threats to the Dutch economy , Dutch culture, and even the power 
of their country within the European Union. 
Shortly after the no vote in the referendum in the Nether-
lands , the European Council met at its regular summit meeting in 
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Brussels. The meeting took place on June 16 and 17, 2005, and 
the heads of state and government of the member states had to 
take stock of the situation with respect to the ratification process 
for the Constitutional Treaty . After a review of the process of 
ratification, the members of the European Council asserted, in 
the Declaration on the Treaty (European Council 2005) , that they 
did not believe that the "no " votes in two referenda meant that 
citizens did not believe in and support the "constructio n of 
Europe." 
The European Council then called for a period of reflection 
to allow a debate to take place in all member states with partici-
pation from "citizens, civil society, social partners, national par-
liaments and political parties ." The President of the Cou ncil , 
Jean-Claude Juncker (Luxembourg Presidency 2005), also issued 
a statement that the ratification process had not been suspended, 
but that more attention must be paid to what the citizens of the 
Union were saying. He also stated there would not be a renego-
tiation of the Treaty, a belief held by some French , that a refer-
endum defeat in France would lead to renegotiation. 
Though, as Juncker stated, the process of ratification was not 
suspended by the European Council; it was only stalled. Some 
member states (Cyprus , Malta, Luxembourg , Belgium, Estonia, 
and Finland) went ahead with ratification plans and approved the 
Constitutional Treaty . This eventually increased ratifying mem-
ber states from ten before the June 2005 European Council meet-
ing to sixteen . Other member states postponed their ratification 
processes . The Czech Republic probably would have scheduled a 
referendum but had not yet. Denmark cancelled its scheduled 
referendum . Ireland, Poland, P01tugal, and the United Kingdom 
postponed or cancelled their referenda . Sweden , which had 
planned legislative ratification, also postponed its process. 
Two member states , Belgium and Estonia, announced inten-
tions to proceed. In Belgium, all but one of the legislative bodies 
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which must ratify the Treaty had done so and the final body held 
a favorable vote on February 8, 2006 . Estonia 's legislature rati-
fied the Treaty on May 9, 2006. In addition, the Finnish parlia-
ment voted in favor of the Constitutional Treaty (and against 
holding a referendum on the Treaty) on May 12, 2006. This vote 
led to ratification of the Treaty by the Parliament on December 5, 
2006, making Finland the sixteenth member state . Bulgaria and 
Romania approved the Treaty and entered the Union on January 
1, 2007, biin ging the total number of Treaty member states to 
eighteen . 
The status of the Constitutional Treaty is now in limbo . The 
European Council in June 2005 agreed to return to this issue in 
the first half of 2006 , at which time the Council said it would 
decide how to proceed . At the June 2006 meeting the Council 
decided to continue the period of reflection on the Treaty until at 
]east early 2007 . Based on statements of some leaders of member 
counrries in the press, it appears the Treaty may be dead. But the 
deeper , more serious problem of the European Union may not be 
the possibl e failure of the Constitutional Treaty , but the alien-
ation from the Union and its policies that some citizens feel as 
demonstrated by the negative referendum results in two member 
states . 
CONCLUSION 
The European Union may very well now be in crisis, but the 
most important cause of crisis may not be the possible failure of 
the Constitutional Treaty . If the Treaty is not ratified , the existing 
treaties all remain in force and they contain the foundational law 
on which the Union is currently based. The Union can continue 
to operate under the treaties now in force . The Treaty of Nice , for 
example , pro vides the necessary institutional changes required 
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for the accession of the ten nations which joined in 2004 as well 
as the two nations (Bulgaria and Romania) which acceded to the 
Union in January 2007 . More important as a source of crisis may 
be the failure of the Union to connect with its citizens suffi-
ciently so that citizens feel a sense of attachment to the Union 
and a sense of ownership of it. Political systems , whether na-
tional governments or organizations of a very special type like 
the European Union, need the support of citizens to prosper and 
be strong and powerful. Though the Union is not about to col-
lapse , it does face challenges from its citizens . How can the Un-
ion engage its citizens , gain citizens ' approval of the Union and 
its future directions, and ensure that citizens believe in the le-
gitimacy of the European Union? 
The European Union possesses democratic legitimacy in a 
formal, legal sense . Treaties which are the foundational law of 
the Union have been negotiated and ratified in accord with the 
constitutional requirements of member states. The institutions of 
the Union which make Union law can also be seen as legitimate. 
National leaders , including Prime Minister Tony Blair of the 
United Kingdom , have argued for a "dual legitimacy" of the Un-
ion (Smith 2005) . The two sources of the legitimacy of the Euro-
pean Union institutions are first , the direct elections to the 
European Parliament which provide that institution with legiti-
macy, and second , the national mandates held by the leaders of 
national governments of the member states who comprise the 
European Council and the Council of Ministers. 
But the European Union also needs its citizens to believe in 
its legitimacy . In their first discussion paper the members of the 
Working Group (of the Federal Trust , a think tank in the United 
Kingdom) on 'Democracy , Legitimacy , and Accountability in the 
EU ' (Working Group 2006, 2) refer to this aspect of legitimacy 
as ' political' or 'psychological' legitimacy . The Working Group 
argues legitimacy "felt or intuited by the individual citizen m 
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regard to the prevailing political structures under which he or she 
lives" is present "at best patchily" in the European Union. It is 
clear that some citizens do not believe in the Union, its institu-
tions, and processes. Some citizens do not accept the roles and 
functions of the Union as they do accept the roles and functions 
of their national governmental institutions. They do not believe 
in the legitimacy of the Union, and no statements by leaders of 
the sources of the democratic legitimacy of the Union seem to 
create that belief. Of course, the lack of belief in legitimacy and 
the lack of acceptance of the roles and functions of the Union are 
not universal throughout the European Union. Clearly some citi-
zens are very supportive of the Union and its activities, for ex-
ample in Belgium and Luxembourg, two of the founding 
member states of the Union, and in Spain whose citizens ap-
proved the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum. 
But in other member states there are more and more ques-
tions about the Union, and more and more unease among citizens 
about its direction. Citizens ask more questions about the wis-
dom of enlargement, not just in terms of the number of nations 
which should ultimately comprise the European Union, but also 
in terms of which nations are appropriate candidates for mem-
bership in the Union. The case of Turkey is one example of this 
questioning among citizens. 
The official position of the governments of the member 
states supports Turkey's accession to the Union. The (then) 
nventy-five member states all agreed in late 2004 to open formal 
accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. Despite this 
agreement, negotiations almost did not open because of the Aus-
trian government's insistence that Turkey be offered something 
other than full membership in the Union. Austria insisted that 
Turkey be offered a 'privileged partnership.' Turkey rejected this 
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and, after a short delay, Austria relented only after strong pres-
sure from the other twenty-four member states. 
More leaders have become critical of Turkey's possible 
membership in the Union, including Gem1any's Angela Merkel 
whose Christian Democratic Union wants to offer a 'privilege d 
partnership' as well. Former French president Chirac was a sup-
porter (though lukewarm) of Turkey's accession, but Chirac's 
successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, does not support full Turkish mem-
bership. These leaders are now more in tune with popular opin-
ion in many member states also opposed to Turkey's entry. A 
special Eurobarometer conducted in mid-2006 on attih1des to-
wards enlargement (European Commission 2006) showed that 
45% of Union citizens favor further enlargement and 42% are 
opposed, making it clear that citizens are divided on the issue. 
On the accession of Turkey, European Union citizens are also 
divided, but more oppose Turkey's membership than support it. 
Forty-eight percent oppose Turkey's accession, while only 39% 
are in favor. The strongest opposition to Turkey joining the Un-
ion is found in Austria (81 %), Germany (69%), and Luxembourg 
(69%). 
Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca show that opposition by citi-
zens to Turkey's accession to the Union has steadily grown since 
2000 (2007, 7). Their analysis of attitudinal dimensions that in-
form public opinion about Turkey's accession indicates a large 
number of European citizens argue that Turkey is simply not a 
part of Europe in its geography, history, and culture. Citizens 
holding this position are most likely to oppose Turkey's acces-
sion to the European Union. 
Additional questions are being asked by citizens about the 
wisdom of expanding areas of policy making by the Union and 
its increasing integration. More and more citizens, especia lly in 
Denmark and the United Kingdom, are expressing Eurosceptic 
views, but so are citizens in the Netherlands which historically 
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has been very supportive of the Union . But because European 
issues are not discussed or debated for the most part in either 
national election campaigns or the campaigns for seats in the 
European Parliament , citizens have little opportunity to register 
their views . It might be the case, for example, that at least some 
Dutch voters who voted "no" in the referendum on the Constitu-
tional Treaty were not so much saying "no" to that Treaty as say-
ing "no" to some previous Union decisions, such as the euro, on 
which they had not been given a voice or vote. 
Leaders of the Union appear to be out of touch with the 
views and positions of at least some of their citizens on issues of 
the Union and its future directions. Leaders appear to be much 
more supportive of greater integration and enlargement of the 
Union than are citizens of many of the member states. This indi-
cates a potential crisis in the Union and a loss of legitimacy of 
the Union if its citizens, because of disagreement with Union 
policies and decisions, come to no longer believe in the legiti-
macy of the Union. What can be done? At the least, there needs 
to be better communication between the European Union and its 
citizens which must focus on European-level issues, policies, and 
decisions. If there is not, the Union will at best stagnate, and at 
worse could begin to come apart. The challenge for leaders, if 
they want the Union to continue to develop and prosper, is to 
bridge the gap with their citizens which the failed referenda on 
the Constitutional Treaty indicate is growing wider. 
How could this gap be bridged? A role could be played by 
the people 's directly elected representatives in the Union 's insti-
tutional structure-the members of the European Parliament. 
More specifically, the European party groups in the European 
Parliament could take the lead. Parliament has become a more 
powerful institution within the Union and its leaders could help 
to forge a better connection between the people and the Union. 
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Within the Parliament, members do not organize themselves as 
nationality groups but as political party groups . The current Par-
liament, elected in 2004, includes seven party groups. The two 
dominant groups are the Group of the European People's Party 
and European Democrats, composed of MEPs from Christian 
Democratic parties and parties with similar ideologies , and the 
Group of the Party of European Socialists, composed of MEPs 
from Socialist parties and the like. These European party groups 
could take the lead within the Union by engaging in functions 
similar to national political parties within member states. 
Within individual democratic countries, national political 
parties do much to develop and articulate alternative policies, 
ideas, and visions of the future, thereby allowing citizens, in 
elections, to choose the directions for their respective countries. 
As a result national governments in democratic nations generally 
adopt policies citizens want. The roles which political parties 
play in democratic political systems do much to establish and 
maintain the legitimacy of governments for their citizens . Simi-
larly, European party groups could enhance the legitimacy of the 
Union in the eyes of European citizens. 
The European party groups could first articulate policy 
commitments and positions on important issues within the Euro-
pean Union. The party groups already do so somewhat, but they 
could expand their role by adopting alternative policies and vi-
sions of the future for the Union. The European party groups all 
have web sites, accessible through a link on the main page of the 
European Parliament's web site (www.europarl.europa.eu). On 
these party group web pages are statements regarding issue posi-
tions. More could be done to articulate alternative futures for 
voter choice . The European party groups in the Parliament would 
have to persuade the national political parties which are a part of 
each group to adopt these commitments and positions about 
European Union matters and also to nominate candidates for the 
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European Parliament who would run on the basis of these com-
mitments and positions . 
If this were to happen, it could transfonn European Parlia-
ment elections into true European elections (as opposed to 
twenty-seven separate national elections with national issues and 
policies debated) and allow voters a choice of candidates for 
MEP based on European issues rather than national ones. Mak-
ing this happen would be difficult and depend on many factors 
falling into place . Individual European party groups in the Par-
liament would have to agree on broad commitments and policies. 
The party groups would have to persuade the national parties 
within the individual European party groups to adopt the com-
mitments and policies and nominate candidates for seats in the 
European Parliament who would then run on the basis of these 
shared ideas . Voters in the member states would have to partici-
pate in these debates on European matters and make their voting 
decisions in selecting MEPs based on European commitments 
and policies , rather than voting for the candidate of the national 
party most endorsed by voter~ on national policy matters . 
Making this happen would not be simple . But it does seem 
reasonable to suggest that a larger role may be played by the 
leaders of the Union most directly connected with citizens ; 
namely , the citizen-elected representatives in the European Par-
liament. 
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